The main rationale of the Oslo Accords was that establishing a 23rd
Arab state ten miles away from Tel-Aviv would bring peace to Israel and
stability to the Middle-East. This
theory no longer passes the laughing test.
Besides the bloody mess engendered by Oslo, the so-called “Arab Spring”
has brought the European-inspired model of Arab nation-states to its
knees. So why resuscitate a failed and
dying model for a fictitious “Palestinian people” that has embraced Islamism
like the rest of the Arab world?
Because of demography, of course.
A Palestinian state might not bring peace, we are told, but it is
nonetheless a necessity to save Israel from turning into a bi-national or a
segregationist country.
Since proponents of the “two-state solution” were so wrong about peace,
why assume that they are so right about demography?
The two-state solution has become a two-state religion, so let me
indulge in blasphemy.
For a start, Gaza is now out of the equation. The “demographic threat” must therefore be
gauged in pre-1967 Israel as well as in Judea and Samaria, i.e. in what is
known as “the area between the River and the Sea” (referred to as “the area” in
this article).
The case for the “demographic threat” is based on a census conducted in
1997 by the “Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics” (PCBS). According to that census, there were 2.78
million Arabs in Judea and Samaria in 1997.
This figure surprised many at the time because a similar census
conducted by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) in 1996 had revealed
that the number of Arab residents in Judea and Samaria was of 2.11
million. How could the Arab population
have increased so rapidly within a year?
The answer is that the PCBS included 325,000 overseas residents and
double-counted the 210,000 Arab residents of Jerusalem. In 2011, there were about 400,000 Arab
residents of Judea and Samaria living overseas.
They are still included in the PCBS demographic count. According to internationally accepted demographic standards, overseas residents who
are abroad for over a year are not counted demographically. The PCBS does not
abide by this international standard (Israel does). Yet Israel’s public discourse on the “demographic
threat” is based on the PCBS’ flawed census.
The PCBS also assumed, back in 1997, that there would be an annual net
Arab immigration to Judea, Samaria and Gaza of 45,000. In reality, there has been an annual net Arab
emigration from Judea, Samaria and Gaza of 25,000 on average.
In 2012, Jews constitute a two-third majority in the area (66% exactly). When Israel declared its independence in
1947, there was an opposite ratio (one third of Jews). In 1900, Jews were an 8% minority. So far, therefore, time has been on the Jews’
side. The question is whether time will
continue to be on our side. Recent demographic
trends suggest that the answer is positive.
Since 1992, the Arab fertility rate in Judea and Samaria has decreased
significantly and consistently (it is now of 3.2 births per woman). Within pre-1967 Israel, the Arab fertility
rate has decreased from 9.23 in 1964 to 3.5 today. This decrease has been constant. Jewish fertility rates have also decreased
since 1964, but very slightly: from 3.39 in 1964 to 3.0 today. But, more significantly, the Jewish fertility
rate started increasing in the late 1990s (it was 2.62 in 1999, 2.71 in 2004,
and 3.0 in 2011). The fertility gap
between Jews and Arabs went from 5.84 in 1964 to 0.5 today. So the gap is closing, to the Jews’
advantage.
The constant increase of the Jewish fertility rate since the late 1990s
is not only due to traditionally high rates among Orthodox Jews. Indeed, this rate has been increasing among
secular Israelis.
The ICBS has consistently overestimated Arab fertility rates and
underestimated Jewish fertility rates.
Yet the “demographic threat” discourse is based on the ICBS’ mistaken
predictions.
Then there is immigration and emigration. While there have been constant waves of
Jewish immigration (“Aliya”) since Israel’s independence, there has been a net
annual emigration of Arab residents from Judea and Samaria and from Gaza in
recent years: 10,000 in 2004, 25,000 in 2006, and 28,000 in 2008.
So the claim that Israel would turn into a bi-national state were it to
annex Judea and Samaria is unfounded. Jews
would still constitute a two-third majority, and that majority would continue
to increase according to the latest demographic trends. Whether it is desirable for Israel to have a
one-third minority of Arab citizens is admittedly a question that deserves to
be asked, but the “bi-national threat” is groundless.
Future demographic trends must also take immigration and emigration into
account. During the National Unity
Government of Yitzhak Shamir and Shimon Peres (1984-1988), both leaders
disagreed on the likeliness of massive Aliya from the Soviet Union. Peres claimed that bringing Jews from the
Soviet Union was completely fanciful and that Shamir was advocating this idea
only to provide a demographic rationale for his “annexationist ambitions in the
West Bank” (as quoted by Dr. Zvi Zameret).
Yet Shamir was right and Peres was wrong: a million Jews immigrated to
Israel from the Soviet Union and from Ethiopia under Shamir’s watch.
Today, the main reservoirs of potential Aliya to Israel are in North
America and in Western Europe (5.27 million in the United States; 375,000 in
Canada; 483,000 in France; 292,000 in Britain).
Aliyah from English-speaking countries has increased significantly in
the past decade partly thanks to the wonderful work done by Nefesh
BeNefesh. Many French Jews are on their
way out, as explained by Michel Gurfinkiel in his latest
blog.
Those who say today that bringing even half a million Jews from America
and Europe in the next decade is fanciful should remember that the same claim
was made two decades ago about Soviet Jewry.
Last but not least is the issue of economic incentives to encourage emigration. On that issue I just want to ask a question:
why is it acceptable to suggest economic incentives for Jews to leave Judea and
Samaria, but unacceptable to suggest the very same idea for Arab
residents?
In 1947, Prof. Roberto Bachi implored Ben-Gurion not to declare
independence. Bachi, a Professor of
Statistics at the Hebrew University and the founder of Israel’s Central Bureau
of Statistics, claimed at the time that with a population of 600,000 the Jews
would become a minority by 1967. Bachi
did not take into account the massive waves of Aliya, in which he did not
believe. His predictions were grossly
mistaken but his spirit of doom was carried on by his student and follower Sergio
Della Pergola (an Italian Jew like Bachi himself).
Had Ben-Gurion listened to statisticians and demographers in 1947, there
would never have been a Jewish state. Contrary
to what the same statisticians and demographers say today, Israel’s future as a
Jewish and democratic state would not be undermined by the annexation of Judea
and Samaria –provided that Israel actively encourages Aliyah from the West in
the coming years. As Ben-Gurion said
after declaring independence: “A Jewish government whose concerns and actions
will not be predominantly geared to the enterprise of aliya and settlement …
will betray its foremost responsibility and will endanger the great historical
achievement gained by our generation.”
